Bypassing the Learned Intermediary:  Potential Liability for Failure to Warn in Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising by Hall, Tim S.
Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy
Volume 2
Issue 2 Spring 1993 Article 6
Bypassing the Learned Intermediary: Potential
Liability for Failure to Warn in Direct-to-Consumer
Prescription Drug Advertising
Tim S. Hall
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hall, Tim S. (1993) "Bypassing the Learned Intermediary: Potential Liability for Failure to Warn in Direct-to-Consumer Prescription
Drug Advertising," Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy: Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 6.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol2/iss2/6
BYPASSING THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY:





I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
ADVERTISING ................................... 451
II. FAILURE TO WARN DOCTRINE: ELEMENTS
OF THE CASE .................................... 454
A- DUTY ........................................... 455
B. BREACH ......................................... 455
C. CAUSATION ....................................... 456
III. THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE ............... 456
A. CONTENT OF A LEGALLY SUFFICIENT WARNING ............ 458
B. WHO GETS WARNED: THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY
RULE . .......................................... 459
1. The Rule ...................................... 459
2. Exceptions ..................................... 462
a. Birth Control ................................. 462
b. Mass Inoculations ............................... 463
IV. FDA REGULATION OF PRESCRIPTION
DRUG ADVERTISING .............................. 464
V. PREEMPTION OF STATE TORT LAW BY
FDA REGULATION? ............................... 466
A. FDA REGULATION AND PREEMPTION OF
STATE TORT LAW .................................. 466
B. CASE LAw DOES NOT SUPPORT PREEMPTION .............. 467
C. THE POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST PREEMPTION ........... 468
1. Need for Substantive Outside Review of
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising ..................... 469
2. "Judicial Incompetence"............................. 470
3. Tort as Cure for Market Failure .................... 472
CONCLUSION ....................................... 473
449
450 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 2:449
INTRODUCTION
Direct-to-consumer advertising' is one of the most significant
recent developments in the marketing of prescription drugs,
potentially opening vast new markets for advertisers and
introducing innovative products to potential patients otherwise
unaware of recent developments. The rise of direct-to-consumer
advertising also raises new problems; specifically, how to regu-
late the flow of information to patients through advertising.
Direct-to-consumer advertising undermines the traditional
legal rules governing transmission of information to patients.
Current FDA regulations require drug manufacturers to provide
information and warnings directed at the prescribing physi-
cian,' who in turn must warn the patient under common law
tort doctrine. A drug manufacturer is generally not liable for
failing to directly warn the consumer of potential adverse
consequences of prescribed drugs.3 This "learned intermediary"
rule follows from the assumption that the prescribing physician
is best able to properly communicate the relevant risks to the
patient and most able to understand a complex warning when
deciding whether the stated risks outweigh the benefits for a
particular patient.
When drug manufacturers advertise directly to consumers,
they bypass the intermediary assumed by the traditional legal
duties. The drug company has no duty under current regula-
tions to provide a warning tailored to the consumer. The
required physician-directed warnings are too complex to effi-
ciently educate consumers. Further, the doctor must deal with
an unknown source of information. The doctor will find it
commensurately harder to educate patients with preconceived
expectations about a treatment gained from direct-to-consumer
advertisements.
This article examines current tort doctrine and FDA regula-
tion relevant to direct-to-consumer prescription drug advertising
and draws three conclusions. First, although the FDA has the
statutory and constitutional authority to regulate this practice,
it has not done so to date, relying instead on regulations
1 Throughout this article, the term "direct-to-consumer advertising" will
refer to direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs. Advertising of
over-the-counter drugs is beyond the scope of this article.
2 See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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designed to police advertising directed to health-care profes-
sionals.
Second, these current regulations are inadequate to cope
with the issues raised by direct-to-consumer advertising.
Specifically, they present no workable solution to the potential
problem of informed consent, nor do they provide a uniform
framework for realistic depictions of a drug's benefits and
dangers to a lay audience.
Third, until such time as the FDA explicitly acts to occupy
this area, or until Congress states an intent to preempt concur-
rent state tort regulation, state tort laws are not preempted
from regulating direct-to-consumer prescription drug adver-
tising. Indeed, state tort law, in the absence of explicit federal
regulation tailored to direct-to-consumer advertising, should be
used to police direct-to-consumer prescription drug advertising.
State courts can provide a level of review that is lacking in
agency procedure at the federal level and protect individual
consumers from overreaching by drug companies and from
mistakes by the FDA.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
ADVERTISING
In the mid-1980's, previously firm opposition to
direct-to-consumer advertising among medical professionals,4
regulators, and even the public began to ebb.5 Pressure on the
FDA to change its policy of opposition to direct-to-consumer
advertising resulted in 1985 in FDA action lifting the
moratorium.6  Early advertising campaigns were not
4 The American Medical Association held out longer than other groups in
its opposition to direct-to-consumer advertising, but even the AMA has
recently lifted its official opposition to direct-to-consumer advertising, subject
to two conditions. First, the ad in question must have "educational value,"
and second, drug manufacturers must provide "physician education materials."
AMA Overturns Long-Standing Direct-to-Consumer RxAd Ban, Providing Ads
Have "Education" Value and Physician Education Materials Are Made
Available, FOOD DRUG COSM. REP. PRESCRIPTION AND OTC PHARMACEUTICALS
(THE PINK SHEET), June 29, 1992, at 3; Patricia Winters, Prescription Drug
Ads Up, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 18, 1993, at 10.
' See Louis A. Morris et al., The Attitudes of Consumers Toward Direct
Advertising of Prescription Drugs, PUB. HEALTH REP., Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 82.
6 See Merrell Dow Planning Rx Direct Consumer Ads in Wake of FDA
Decision Sept. 9 to Lift Voluntary Moratorium, FOOD DRUG COSM. REP.
PRESCRIPTION AND OTC PHARMACEUTICALS (THE PINK SHEET), Sept. 16, 1985,
1993]
452 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 2:449
product-specific, but were more purely "informative." They were
designed to heighten public awareness of a health "problem"
and encourage potential patients to consult a doctor.' Of
course, the most vocal proponents of this form of advertising are
those companies with market dominance in a given category of
drug, since they are likely to reap the lion's share of the
rewards.' For example, if a company has a seventy percent
market share in a category, it will likely receive the same
percentage of new prescriptions resulting from a non-product-
specific ad campaign, no matter who actually pays for the
advertisements.
Upjohn Company was the first manufacturer to use
product-specific direct-to-consumer advertising in the U.S. for
promoting its hair-loss treatment, Rogaine.9 This product was,
in hindsight, probably the ideal test case for direct-to-consumer
advertising, at least from a products liability perspective.
Although a prescription drug, Rogaine is in many ways a cos-
metic product, easily analogized to the birth control exception to
the learned intermediary rule." The decision to use the
product is likely to be discretionary, not fueled by medical
necessity. A doctor need only be consulted to determine initial
eligibility for the treatment and to facilitate purchase of the
drug. In addition, the chances of severe injury resulting from
use of the product are low." Thus, the damage element of any
at 3.
' See, e.g., Advertisement by Merck describing the prostate, its functions,
and the symptoms of prostate enlargement, TIME, Jan. 25, 1993, at 20-21.
8 In 1992, Merck Co., following the introduction of Proscar, a
"ground-breaking" new prostate cancer treatment, spent $10 million on a
campaign to "promote awareness of prostate disease." Winters, supra note 4.
These ads are not universally well-received. See, e.g., Miracle Drugs or Media
Drugs, CONSUMER REP., Mar. 1992, at 142 ("[Piromoting drugs in the guise of
public education allows the promoters to publicize uses for the drug that have
not received FDA approval, and to disregard a drug's side effects .... ).
' See Amy Bernstein, Prescription Drugs: Pitching Directly to the Patient,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 15, 1990, at 46. Some ads that appeared prior
to the Rogaine campaign were criticized for crossing the line between informa-
tion and product-specific selling. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Anticholesterol Mock-
Up TV Spot Citing "Rx Medication" Approaches "Gray Area" Between Educa-
tion and Drug Ad, FDA Tells Food & Drug Law Institute, FOOD DRUG COSM.
REP. PRESCRIPTIONS AND OTC PHARMACEUTICALS (THE PINK SHEET), Feb. 1,
1988, at 16.
10 See infra part III.B.2.a.
n "The most common adverse effects [of topical Rogaine use] are local
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potential tort claim is minimal, and Upjohn's liability exposure
small.
Since Upjohn's initial direct-to-consumer advertising cam-
paign, several other firms have conducted similar campaigns. 2
Extensive direct-to-consumer advertising campaigns have been
conducted for Seldane 13 and Hismanal," two non-sedating
antihistamines, and for various brands of anti-smoking "patch"
transdermal nicotine delivery systems. 5
The reasons for directly informing potential consumers
about these particular drugs are clear. In the case of non-sed-
ating antihistamines, a large market of users of traditional
antihistamine medications already exists. 6 The incentive is to
inform this market of a new and attractive alternative medica-
tion faster than would be possible if the drug companies depend-
ed solely on physicians as a conduit of information. The condi-
tions treated by antihistamines"v often do not require extensive
physician involvement, and a patient may see a doctor only
infrequently.
For anti-smoking treatments, a large body of potential users
exists who, before the introduction of these drugs, might not
have considered consulting a doctor to stop smoking. Advertis-
ing the drug to physicians would thus be extremely under-
inclusive, reaching only those patients already under the care of
a doctor for related diseases, but not smokers who have yet to
dermatologic reactions ... and [are] usually mild." AMERICAN HOSPITAL
FORMULtLARY SERVICE, MISCELLANEOUS SKIN AND Mucous MEMBRANE AGENTS
84:36: MINOXIDIL (1989), available in LEXIS, Genmed Library, AHFS File.
12 Prescription drug advertising spending reached $200 million in 1992.
See Winters, supra note 4.
13 See TIME, Aug. 12, 1991, at 7-8.
14 See NEWSWEEK, July 15, 1991, at 10-12.
See TiME, Jan. 25, 1993, at 41-42; TIME, Mar. 15, 1993, at 42-43 (Adver-
tisement for Norplant System contraceptive implants); id. at 50 (Advertise-
ment for Cardizem CD, touted as a cheaper alternative to Cardizem).
16 For example, in 1988, the market for non-sedating antihistamines was
over $180 million. Johnson & Johnson's Hismanal (Astemizole) Is Second
Non-Sedating Rx Antihistamine, WKLY. PHARMACY REP. (THE GREEN SHEET),
Jan. 9, 1989, at 2.
17 "Antihistamines are most often used to provide symptomatic relief of
allergic symptoms ...." AMERICAN HOSPITAL FORmuLARY SERVICE, ANTIHIS-
TAMINE DRUGS: ANTIHISTAMINES GENERAL STATEMENT (1979), available in
LEXIS, Genmed Library, AHFS File.
1993]
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develop smoking-related symptoms or who do not otherwise see
a doctor regularly.
These two categories of drugs have potentially dangerous
side effects or drug interactions which complicate the duty to
warn. Seldane and Hismanal have been under FDA inquiries
which found that users of these drugs are subject to increased
risk of heart disease in some circumstances.'" Similarly, nico-
tine patches have recently come under FDA scrutiny, as have
the ads promoting them. 9 Anecdotal reports tend to show a
higher incidence of heart disease among users of the patches
who continue to smoke, physician confusion about how to
prescribe the patch, failure to accompany the patch with behav-
ioral modification therapy, and confusion among patients as to
the proper use of the patches.2 °
This article argues that because of the lack of FDA regula-
tion specifically addressing direct-to-consumer advertising, state
tort law should be used to impose additional requirements on
the content of drug advertisements. These state tort require-
ments can ensure that direct-to-consumer advertisements carry
warnings that are specifically designed to convey reasonable
warnings to lay users of drugs, not merely the prescribing
physicians. Drug manufacturers must design their advertise-
ments carefully, looking not only to FDA advertising regula-
tions, but to common law reasonableness standards to avoid
imposition of liability.
II. FAILURE TO WARN DOCTRINE:
ELEMENTS OF THE CASE
Although failure to warn cases are often couched in the
strict liability language of section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, in reality the doctrine necessarily involves a
measure of negligence-based "reasonableness" testing by a
jury." Thus, the plaintiff must plead and prove: (a) an injury
18 See Warning Is Being Issued for the Drug Seldane, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
1992, at A20; Warning Issued on 2dAntihistamine, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1992,
at C2.
19 Nicotine Replacement Product Direct-to-Customer Ads Are Appropriate
Thing to Do; Boxed Label Warning Could Discourage Quit Attempts - AMA
Advisory Comm., FOOD DRUG COSM. REP. PRESCRIPTION AND OTC PHARMA-
CEUTICALS (THE PINK SHEET), July 20, 1992, at 8.
20 See Elyse Tanouye, WALL ST. J., October 20, 1992, at B5.
21 See Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 425 (2d Cir. 1969).
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(b) caused (c) by the breach (d) of an affirmative duty to warn of
the dangerous nature of a product.
A. DUTY
Courts generally hold that a duty to warn arises when it
would be unreasonable to market the product without such a
warning. Anderson v. Kix Chem. Co.22 states that the issue of
duty to warn is a negligence inquiry; the relevant question
being whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the product
would be unreasonably dangerous if distributed without a
warning. Consistent with the reasonableness core of this
standard, manufacturers generally are not required to warn of
the danger of an allergic or other unusual reaction to a product
unless the risk is shared by a significant number of users.'
If a defendant does not supply an adequate warning with a
product, that product is thereby rendered unreasonably danger-
ous. Some courts express this rule by stating that without a
sufficient warning, strict liability attaches to the sale of the
product and the manufacturer is liable for any harm it caus-
es.2' This is not precisely accurate, since the question of
whether or not to warn is decided upon reasonableness (i.e.,
negligence-based) standards.
B. BREACH
The duty to warn may be breached by a complete failure to
warn or by a failure to deliver a sufficient warning. A warning
may be judged insufficient where it is directed at the wrong
recipient or where its substance is inadequate. A substantively
sufficient warning is judged on a reasonableness standard,
meaning that a reasonably prudent manufacturer would have
supplied such a warning on the facts of the present case. The
plaintiff must identify a specific danger that should have been
the subject of a warning, show the defendant's knowledge of
(holding that comment k to § 402A is an exception to the doctrine of strict
liability).
22 472 P.2d 806, 808 (Or. 1970).
' See C. A. Hoover & Son v. 0. M. Franklin Serum Co., 444 S.W.2d 596,
598 (Tex. 1969).
4 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carmenita Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 238 Cal. Rptr. 18
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
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that danger at the time the warning was or should have been
given," and show an alternative warning which could have
been implemented by the defendant and which would have
changed plaintiffs behavior so that he would not have been
injured.
C. CAUSATION
The issue of causation is a subject of some controversy in
failure to warn litigation. The debate centers upon whether the
plaintiff must prove proximate cause (i.e., that given an ade-
quate warning, plaintiff would have modified his action); or
cause in fact (i.e., mere evidence of inadequacy of the actual
warning given). Opponents of a proximate cause requirement
claim that if this proof is required, it will undermine the norma-
tive policies behind strict tort liability insofar as the manufac-
turer will escape liability for injuries caused by a defect (the
lack of warning) in his product. Failure to warn, however, is
not a pure strict liability theory. A manufacturer is not negli-
gent for failure to warn if the plaintiff's proposed warning would
have had no substantive effect on the behavior of its recipients.
III. THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE
Prescription drug manufacturers are exempt from the duty
to warn the end consumer of potential dangers associated with
use of a drug. This rule arises out of comment k to the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 402A.2" Comment k
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
26 Comment k reads:
Unavoidably Unsafe Products. There are some products which in
the present state of human knowledge are quite incapable of being
made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially
common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the
vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly
leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is inject-
ed. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death,
both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified,
notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they
involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by
proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreason-
ably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines,
and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be
sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician.
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shields drug manufacturers from strict liability, and forces any
analysis of their liability into the realm of negligence.
Negligence-based liability can take three forms: liability for
negligent manufacture, liability for failure to warn properly, or
liability for defective product design.
Because of the uncertainty of much drug design, and the
fact that even a designer may not know for certain how a drug
works (and the inability of a designer to substitute a less dan-
It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as
to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient
medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps
even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justi-
fies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically
recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the
qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and
proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be
held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their
use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an
apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but
apparently reasonable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
' A recent commentator claims that comment k is not applied to prescrip-
tion drugs universally. See Note, A Question of Competence: The Judicial
Role in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, 103 HARV. L. REv. 773, 777-78 n.29
(1990). Without ruling out the possibility that rogue courts will bypass
comment k and impose strict liability, the case which that Note cites, Feldman
v. Lederle Lab, 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992),
is not a strict liability case, whatever the court may claim. Courts often claim
strict liability status for comment k analysis. This doctrinal confusion
probably springs from the fact that comment k imposes a negligence-based test
as a threshold question determining the applicability of strict liability. The
court in Feldman stated that "drug manufacturers have a duty to warn of
dangers of which they know or should have known on the basis of reasonably
available knowledge." Id. at 389. The use of "reasonableness" language is the
keystone of negligence-based inquiry. The court further states that if this test
is not met, strict liability will apply. Id. Close analysis of the concept of strict
liability will show that, if true strict liability were used here, the initial
reasonableness question would never be asked. Strict liability abandons the
questions of duty and breach found in negligence analysis and focuses exclu-
sively on defect and causation. One could argue that the Feldman test is
strict liability insofar as it defines as "defective" a drug which carries an
unreasonable warning, then applies strict liability to those drugs. This
analysis is functionally equivalent to stating that all drugs that carry insuffi-
cient warnings are unreasonably dangerous, which is a negligence-based
analysis. This distinction is meaningless because of the fact that either way,
the true test of liability is the first step in the analysis, which is a reasonable-
ness inquiry, not strict liability.
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gerous alternative),' courts traditionally have not applied
defective design analysis to prescription drugs.29
Comment k expressly preserves manufacturing defect and
warning theories of liability in its qualification that to avoid
liability a product must be "properly prepared, and accompanied
by proper [physician-directed] directions and warning."3 This
article will focus on liability for failure to warn, as that is the
doctrine which has been expressly modified upon consideration
of the problems raised by prescription drugs.3
A. CONTENT OF A LEGALLY SUFFICIENT WARNING
The duty to warn 2 is imposed to "apprise the user of a
This characteristic may be changing with advances in our understanding
of how drugs work at biochemical levels. The law may or may not keep up
with technological developments. See James A. Henderson & Aaron D.
Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512 (1992) (arguing for no design review for
prescription drugs). To the extent that courts are slow to adopt design
liability for a product that is susceptible of design change, manufacturers will
be the beneficiaries of a windfall in the form of liability avoidance.
' The American Law Institute has recently decided to revise the Restate-
ment of Torts. Professors James Henderson and Aaron Twerski have been
named as the reporters for the Products Liability provisions. Coincidentally,
Henderson and Twerski recently published a proposed revision of § 402A,
intended to cut through the years' accumulation ofjudicial glosses on the text
of the original 402A and its comments and to create a "true" restatement of
the state of the law. Professors Henderson and Twerski reject most litigation
of design defect issues in drug litigation, arguing that failure to warn doctrine
encompasses the vast majority of the cases where design review would be
useful.
[Sbo long as a group exists for whom the drug in question is the
drug of choice, then the issue of design has no place in the applica-
ble liability law .... To warn adequately [of the dangers of an
unreasonably designed drug], the manufacturer would have to
inform the medical profession either that its product is useless or
that a fully acceptable alternative to the drug exists that has all the
benefits but fewer of the detriments of the drug in question.
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 28, at 1538-39.
o RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 402A cmt. k. Liability for negligent
manufacture is also irrelevant to direct-to-consumer advertising. A product
negligently manufactured will expose its sellers to tort liability regardless of
how it is advertised.
si See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
The duty to warn is imposed by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388
(1965). I recognize here a distinction between warnings, which are designed
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danger which he is not aware of, so that he can protect himself
against it."33  There is no duty to warn of obvious risks.3'
The content of an appropriate warning is an issue of fact for a
jury.3 The precision and clarity required varies with the
severity of potential danger and the commonness and familiarity
of the product. On this analysis, warnings about prescription
drugs are generally subject to a quite high standard, since the
potential for harm is almost unlimited, and the average consum-
er cannot be expected to know much, if anything, about the
potential biological effects of the product. "In the case of ex-
tremely dangerous products, the supplier may be required to go
to considerable lengths to inform the required persons of dan-
ger, and may be held liable if it engages in other sales activity
which has the effect of offsetting the otherwise sufficient warn-
ing.36
B. WHO GETS WARNED: THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE
1. The Rule
Given that a duty to warn arises in connection with pre-
scription drugs, the next logical question is: who can or should
be the subject of a legally sufficient warning?
to help a consumer recognize and avoid, if possible, an inherent danger in the
product; and instructions, which are designed to teach a consumer how to use
a product so as to avoid unnecessary danger. Because of the nature of drugs
as essentially unalterable quantities, the relevant consumer choice informed
by warning is often simply whether the potential benefits outweigh the known
risks. But see Henderson & Twerski, supra note 28
' Lister v. Bill Kelley Athletic, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 483, 487 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985).
" See Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957).
' Miles v. Kohli & Kaliher Assoc., Ltd., 917 F.2d 235, 246 (6th Cir. 1990)
("The fact finder may find a warning to be unreasonable, hence inadequate, in
its factual content, its expression of the facts, or the method or form in which
it is conveyed.") (quoting Seley v. G.D. Searle Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 837 (Ohio
1981)).
36 Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Failure to Warn as Basis for Liability
under Doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort, 53 A.L.R. 3D 239, 245 (1973); see
also Sterling Drug v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969) (warning insuffi-
cient because of the overly optimistic and salesman-like tone of the warning
letter).
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The general rule is that the end user is entitled to a warn-
ing about the dangers associated with the product, 7 consistent
with the policy of encouraging informed consent. Courts have
been willing to modify this rule, however, in cases where the
end user is not in a position to use or benefit from the informa-
tion contained in a legally sufficient warning. Thus, in Stevens
v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,"3 the manufacturer of an airplane that
crashed was not required to have warned the individual passen-
gers about the load capacity of the plane. The court reasoned
that the load of the aircraft depends upon too many factors for
the individual passenger to be able to use the information
effectively to mitigate the risk faced. The airline served as a
"learned intermediary" who, because of its superior ability to
make use of the information, is a more sensible target for the
legal duty to warn.
The learned intermediary rule is also widely applied to
prescription drug cases. The rationale for not requiring warn-
ings to individual patients is that the patient is not capable of
effectively making use of the information given, and the physi-
cian is better able to make an informed choice about the balance
of risks and benefits to be gained from use of the drug. 9
Professor Schwartz has identified four separate rationales
for the learned intermediary rule.4 ° First, physicians ultimate-
ly decide whether and what drug to prescribe based on available
alternates. Second, physicians are already legally obligated to
convey risk/benefit information to patients under the doctrine of
informed consent, so such a duty on the part of the drug manu-
facturer to also convey information to patients would be redun-
dant. Third, providing information to the patient outside of the
traditional doctor-patient relationship (such as through
direct-to-consumer advertising) could interfere with that rela-
, See, e.g., Griggs v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 513 F.2d 851 (8th Cir.
1975) (requiring manufacturers and suppliers to provide a warning on a
product so that it would reach the ultimate consumer); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
38 170 Cal. Rptr. 925 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
" In order to use the learned intermediary exception, however, a drug
manufacturer must have provided a legally adequate warning to the physician.
See Fornoff v. Parke Davis & Co., 434 N.E.2d 793 (IMI. App. Ct. 1982).
40 Teresa M. Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Advertising
and the Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 829, 830
(1991).
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tionship by deterring patients from following their doctors'
advice.41 Fourth, providing this information to patients has
too high a cost or cannot be adequately conveyed by labeling.
These factors, however, also support the creation of an
exception to the learned intermediary rule for direct-to-consu-
mer advertising. First, direct-to-consumer advertising, while it
does not remove physicians from their position of control in
prescribing drugs, clearly influences the balance of power in the
physician-patient relationship. A physician confronted with a
patient who is informed about the treatment alternatives will
probably give substantial weight to that patient's desires when
making treatment decisions. While this clearly should not
lessen the duty physicians have toward their patients to choose
the best treatment alternative, it can support increasing the
duty owed by drug manufacturers. Physicians may not be
aware of the sources of their patients' information, and so may
not be able to effectively counteract unreasonable expectations
which advertising may create. Imposition of a duty to warn on
manufacturers minimizes the dangers of unrealistic portrayals
of a drug's benefits.
Second, while physicians are obligated to convey risk/benefit
information, limitation of that duty to physicians makes more
sense when physicians are the sole source of a patient's infor-
mation about a drug. If a drug manufacturer has no duty to
supplement direct-to-consumer advertisements with warning
information, advertisements weigh into the patient's mix of
information wholly on the positive side, and may tip the balance
regardless of an otherwise perfectly adequate warning conveyed
by a physician.
Third, although interference with the physician-patient
relationship is a concern, patient warnings in drug advertising
41 This rationale presumes a paternalistic model of the doctor-patient
relationship, in which "the physician presents the patient with selected
information that will encourage the patient to consent to the intervention the
physician considers best.... The paternalistic model assumes that there are
shared objective criteria for determining what is best." Ezekiel J. Emanuel &
Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician/Patient Relationship, 267
JAMA 2221, 2221 (1992). In contrast, one of the premises of both the
informed consent and failure to warn doctrines is that the doctor and the
patient share responsibility for decisions affecting treatment. Margaret
Gilhooley, Learned Intermediaries, Prescription Drugs, and Patient Informa-
tion, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 633, 652-54 (1986). These doctrines thus seem to
rest on a "deliberative" or "interpretive" model of the doctor/patient relation-
ship. Emanuel & Emanuel, supra, at 2221-22.
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are unlikely to have the deterrent effect envisioned by Professor
Schwartz. Direct-to-consumer advertising is fundamentally
advertising, designed to create a positive image of the product
in the mind of the consumer. The warnings which FDA regula-
tion and tort law would require will supplement the positive
aspects of the advertising, but will prevent blatant puffery and
insupportable claims of efficacy without destroying the character
of the advertising. Further, any drug which cannot be discussed
without including a warning likely to deter an average user is
not the sort of drug likely to be the subject of direct-to-consumer
advertising.
Fourth, Professor Schwartz claims that provision of warn-
ings directly to patients either has too high a cost or cannot be
adequately conveyed by labeling. One of the functions of tort
law is to ensure that product cost reflects total societal cost.
Refusal to impose a duty to warn on direct-to-consumer adver-
tising would alter the total mix of information that patients
receive, and would skew their treatment choices. This would
provide a windfall to drug manufacturers because they would
not be faced with liability for injuries caused by their advertise-
ments. The substance of the advertisements would also be
altered, since manufacturers would have an incentive to present
as favorable a portrayal of their product as possible without
crossing the line of fraud. In short, the duty to warn, while it
imposes costs on manufacturers in the short term, allows a
more realistic assessment of the true costs of direct-to-consumer
advertising.
2. Exceptions
There are two major exceptions to the learned intermediary
rule. The first applies to birth control pills, the second to mass
clinical inoculations. As this part will show, both of these
exceptions are consistent with Professor Schwartz's policies and
with application of state tort law to direct-to-consumer advertis-
ing.
a. Birth Control
In MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,42 plaintiffs
sued the manufacturer of birth control pills for injuries. The
42 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
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jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs, and Ortho appealed on the
grounds that it did not owe a duty to the end user of the drug,
since it was a prescription item and Ortho had sufficiently
warned the medical community. The appellate court upheld the
jury verdict on three grounds. First, the court held that the
decision to use birth control pills was not analogous to the
decision to use other drugs. The patient generally decides
whether to use the birth control pill based on personal lifestyle
grounds rather than on medical necessity grounds, and the
doctor is consulted only to determine the optimum dosage.
Second, after the initial prescription, the patient has minimal
contact with the physician, and thus minimal opportunity to ask
questions or become informed through the traditional physi-
cian/patient channel. Third, the FDA closely regulates the use
of birth control pills with the stated goal that the end user be
"informed by comprehensible warnings of potential side ef-
fects.' '4
b. Mass Inoculations
The second exception to the learned intermediary rule is for
in oculations performed outside the "normal" doctor-patient
relationship (i.e., in a public clinic, often in connection with
state-mandated vaccination programs)." The rationale here is
similar to the birth-control exception: where there is no direct
physician control over the procedure, and where the decision is
not made for each individual patient by a doctor, the duty to
warn devolves to the manufacturer. 5
These two exceptions to the learned intermediary rule illus-
trate the value courts place on patient information. Where the
4Id. at 69.
4 See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974) (concluding
that a defendant manufacturer has a duty to directly warn individual vaccin-
ees); Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1969) (applying strict
liability to vaccine manufacturers). But see National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act of 1986,42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(a) (Supp. II 1990) (partially overturning the
mass immunization exception and establishing a no-fault recovery system).
For a general discussion on mass immunization cases, see Robert M.
McKenna, The Impact of Product Liability Law on the Development of a
Vaccine Against the AIDS Virus, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 943 (1988).
"' At least one case holds that this duty is delegable, and that the manufac-
turer can satisfy it by contractually obligating another to warn the end user
of the relevant dangers. Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc., 964 F.2d 1348, 1365 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 463 (1992).
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policy concerns supporting the learned intermediary rule, as
noted by Professor Schwartz, do not apply - the physician does
not control the decision-making process and flow of information,
nor is there an ongoing doctor-patient relationship - courts will
circumvent the learned intermediary rule and impose the duty
to warn the patient directly on the manufacturer. Both of these
effects are present to a degree in direct-to-consumer advertising.
IV. FDA REGULATION OF PRESCRIPTION
DRUG ADVERTISING
The FDA regulates drug packaging and labeling.4" Both
the FDA and the courts interpret this mandate to include
regulation of virtually all public statements made about a drug
by its manufacturer, including advertising.47 Currently, the
FDA has promulgated two requirements for providing warnings
about prescription drugs, requiring a package insert and a "brief
summary." These requirements do not specifically address
direct-to-consumer advertising," and as a result, do not ade-
quately protect consumers.
First, the FDA requires a package insert as part of a drug's
packaging.49 The package insert requirements provide the
most comprehensive analysis of a drug's indications and risks.
This information, including a description of the drug, its clinical
pharmacology, indications and usage, contraindications, warn-
ings, precautions, adverse reactions, drug abuse and depen-
dence, overdosage and dosage and administration information,
is clearly designed for the use of the prescribing physician. A
lay consumer trying to make effective use of this information
would be deterred by both the sheer amount and the technical
46 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(k),(m) (1988).
47 See Prohibited Acts, Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) T 4016 (1990)
("Courts. . . have not hesitated [to call advertising qabeling,'] since the FDC
Act definition could have excluded matter that is advertising but did not.");
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1988) (imposing
"brief summary" requirement for prescription drug advertising).
48 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Drug Makers Set Off Bitter Debate With Als
Aimed Directly at Patients, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 1991, at 134 ("Although the
law now governs all prescription drug advertising, it was written at a time
when doctors were the only audience .... ); Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH)
T 70191 (1990) ("[T]here is no statutory distinction between professional
advertising and advertising directed to consumers.").
49 See 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(d)(2) (1992).
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language of the package insert.5" Another drawback is that
this type of warning, because of its length and complexity, is
very difficult to append to a broadcast or print advertisement.
Second, the FDA generally requires that any advertisement
of a drug carry a "brief summary"51 of the information in the
package insert. "The brief summary sets out the drug's adverse
experience profile, contraindications, warnings, and precautions,
as well as the indications for use. The other sections required
in the package insert, such as pharmacology and dosage, are not
required in the brief summary."52 Although the brief summary
requirement is obviously problematic for broadcast advertise-
ments, at least one solution has been implemented. The Life-
time cable television network, which airs health-related seg-
ments aimed at medical professionals, has a policy of airing the
brief summary information for all the advertisements it carries
late at night after its regular programming." The supporting
rationale is that one can set a VCR to record this information,
and then view it at one's leisure.5' This practice, although
possibly reasonable for advertisements aimed at medical profes-
sionals, probably would not be considered reasonable in the
context of a warning directed at a lay consumer.55
Inclusion of the brief summary information is easier for
print media advertisements, since the information can simply be
printed alongside or on the reverse of the advertisement. Still,
there are two obvious complications. First, even the brief
5 0Indeed, the drug as dispensed to the consumer generally will not contain
a package insert, but only directions given by the prescribing doctor or
dispensing pharmacist. If the drug includes in the package insert the informa-
tion required, the FDA does not require the manufacturer to ensure that the
drug label bears "adequate directions for lay use." Special Requirements for
Prescription Drugs, Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) 70,177 (1990). Clearly,
this exception codifies in regulation the learned intermediary rule.
51 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (1992); see also David A. Kessler & Wayne L.
Pines, The Federal Regulation of Prescription Drug Advertising and Promo-
tion, 264 JAMA 2411 (1990).
52 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (1992).
' Kessler & Pines, supra note 51, at 2412-15.
6 Id.
' See Gonzales v. Carmenita Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 238 Cal. Rptr. 18, 22
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) ("Where... a product is unreasonably dangerous absent
a warning ... strict liability in tort will attach if appropriate and conspicuous
warning is not given."' (quoting Burke v. Almaden Vineyards, Inc., 86 Cal.
App. 3d 768, 772 (1978)) (emphasis added)).
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summary information, to comply with FDA regulations, must be
quite complex. To be an adequate warning under common-law
tort doctrine, the text must be comprehensible to the consumer;
that is, it must be able to convince the average consumer to
modify her behavior. 6
Second, the tone or character of the entire communication
can effectively contradict the information in the warning. In
Yarrow v. Sterling Drug,"7 the plaintiffs injury was a side
effect of the drug Aralen. The manufacturer knew of the side
effects, but the side effects had not yet been widely reported in
the medical literature. To inform prescribing physicians of the
dangers, the manufacturer sent "Dear Doctor" letters to over
200,000 physicians. The court held that, although the letter did
describe the potential side effects of the drug, the effectiveness
of the warning was eclipsed by the overly optimistic, salesman-
like tone of the letter. Similarly, an inherent quality of adver-
tisement is that it is intended to present a positive picture of
the effects of the product. Thus, although FDA regulations may
ensure that physicians receive adequate information, the regula-
tions are inappropriate when applied to direct-to-consumer
advertising to ensure consumers receive complete information
on a prescription drug.
V. PREEMPTION OF STATE TORT LAW
BY FDA REGULATION?
A. FDA REGULATION AND PREEMPTION OF STATE TORT LAW
Federal regulations, as well as federal statutes, can pre-
empt state law.18 Preemption may be either expressly intend-
ed by Congress 9 or implied from the regulatory context. If not
66 See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985) (finding a highly technical warning inade-
quate because the consumer did not understand the practical dangers de-
scribed).
1 263 F. Supp. 159 (D.S.D. 1967), affd, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969).
1 Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Lab., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985). The doctrine of federal preemption arises from the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.
9 Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2481 (1991);
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); see also, e.g., 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) (1988) (express preemption clause in Employment Retirement
Income Security Act, stating that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State
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intended, preemption may still be triggered if state law contra-
venes federal policies. Implied preemption occurs in two
circumstances: (1) when federal action in a given field of law so
completely occupies the field as to foreclose state action; ° or
(2) when the nature of the concurrent state and federal regula-
tion causes conflict between state and federal interests or makes
concurrent compliance impossible.61
B. CASE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT PREEMPTION
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act does not express-
ly preempt state tort law in the labeling context.6 2 Courts
must therefore justify preemption, if at all, based on implied
preemption doctrine. The traditional rule in tort cases is that
federal regulation provides a floor, not a ceiling, for product
safety, and so does not preempt concurrent state regulation
through tort law. At least two federal courts have refused to
allow the defense of preemption in failure to warn cases involv-
ing vaccines. Both Abbott v. American Cyanamid Co.' and
laws insofar as they... relate to any employee benefit plan.... ").
' Modem courts rarely find preemption on occupation grounds. Wisconsin
Pub. Intervenor, 111 S. Ct. at 2481-82 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine:
Shifting Perspectives in Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUIm. L. REV.
623 (1975).
61 See California v. Federal Energy Regilatory Conm'n, 495 U.S. 490
(1990); Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor, 111 S. Ct. at 2482; Jones, 430 U.S. at 526;
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1940).
62 1 Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) 4007 (Apr. 1, 1991) (noting that the
only express preemptions relate to food and medical devices). For an example
of medical device preemption analysis, see Stamps v. Collagen Corp., No. 92-
2084, 1993 WL 43588 (5th Cir. 1993) (to be reported at 984 F.2d 1416); Paul
J. Martinek, Implant Suit Preempted; Medical Device Claims Stymied by FDA
Rules, MASS. L. WKLY., Jan. 25, 1993, at 1.
' Teresa M. Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products
Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1135-36 (1988); Roberts v. May, 583
P.2d 305, 308 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978); see also 1 Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH)
4007 (Apr. 1, 1991) ("[S]tate laws that set stricter rules than are established
under the federal laws are not preempted .... ). While compliance with
federal regulations is not a complete defense, the jury may be allowed to
expressly weigh it along with other factors in determining liability. See
Schwartz, supra note 40, at 1136.
6 844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
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Graham v. Wyeth Lab.65 held that state tort law provided a
cause of action regardless of fairly comprehensive federal regu-
lation.
In In re Tetracycline Cases,6" plaintiffs ingested the drug
tetracycline during periods of tooth development. Tetracycline
was known to cause tooth discoloration, and the FDA had
promulgated a warning required to accompany the drug. The
defendant drug manufacturers argued unsuccessfully that,
because of this regulation, state tort law claims were preempt-
ed. Specifically, defendants argued that manufacturers could
not comply with the requirements of both federal regulation and
state tort doctrine without destroying the uniformity that the
federal regulations were designed to achieve. The court held
that state tort regulation of manufacturer warnings was not
inconsistent or in conflict with federal regulation, because the
manufacturer could take action to comply with the state re-
quirements, which would supplement, not conflict with, the FDA
warning requirements. The court noted that "this and other
federal courts have ... ruled that FDA regulation does not
preempt.., the duty to warn of product risks ... [or] the duty
not to place unreasonably dangerous products into
commerce."67  This decision implicitly supports the "floor"
theory of preemption. A state can require additional warnings
without impinging upon a federal interest, so long as it does not
expressly invalidate a specific federal requirement.
C. THE POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST PREEMPTION
Preemption of state tort law by FDA regulation is not only
rejected by the case law. Normative concerns, including princi-
ples of equity, communitarianism, and distributive justice,
require a compensation mechanism for injured consumers of
prescription drugs. Failure to warn litigation is an important
component of this mechanism.
Several recent commentators 68 make the normative case
666 F. Supp. 1483 (D. Kan. 1987).
747 F. Supp. 543 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
6 71 Id. at 550.
1 See, e.g., John F. Del Giorno, Comment, Federal Preemption of Prescrip-
tion Drug Labeling: Antidote for Pharmaceutical Industry Overdosing on State
Court Jury Decisions in Products Liability Cases, 22 J. MARsHALL L. REV. 629
(1989); Note, A Question of Competence: The Judicial Role in the Regulation
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for deferring to the judgment of the FDA regarding the safety of
prescription drugs. While this proposal may make sense in the
context of drug approval, it makes far less sense when applied
to direct-to-consumer advertising. Rather, the need for outside
review of direct-to-consumer advertising, the competence of
juries to determine community standards, and the market
failure remedied by tort all support the need for state tort law
remedies.
1. Need for Substantive Outside Review of
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
First, there is persuasive data that, issues of expertise
aside, the administrators of the FDA will do no better job than
the post hoc enforcers of the courts. A recent study of drug
advertisements showed that ninety two percent of the examined
advertisements contained potential violations of the FDA guide-
lines, and that the average advertisement contained four poten-
tial violations.6 9 This situation is exacerbated by the fact that,
absent special circumstances, drug advertisements need not be
submitted to the FDA for approval prior to publication.7 °
Further, in 1988, the FDA required Sandoz Laboratories to
pull one of its newspaper advertisements due to inaccurate
claims which had been overlooked when the FDA first approved
the advertisement.71 If compliance with FDA procedures acted
as a bar to state tort liability, then a repeat of this error would
of Pharmaceuticals, 103 HARV. L. REV. 773 (1990) [hereinafter Question of
Competence]; Gregory C. Jackson, Comment, Pharmaceutical Product Liability
May Be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to Concurrent
Regulation, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 199 (1992).
69 See Medical Journal Rx Drug Ad Survey Finds Four Potential FDA
Violations Per Ad; Physicians/Pharmacists Surveyed Feel 92% of 1990 Ads
May Be In Violation, FOOD DRUG COSM. REP. PRESCRIPTION AND OTC PHAR-
MACEUTICALS (THE PINK SHEET), June 1, 1992, at 1.
" See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (1992). Advertisements must be submitted
for prior approval if the use of the drug may cause fatalities or serious injury,
and information about this possibility has not been widely publicized in the
medical literature. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(j). See generally Food Drug Cosm. L.
Rep. (CCII) 70191.
71 Michelle D. Ehrlich, Comment, Doctors Can Just Say No: The Constitu-
tionality of Consumer-Directed Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 12 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 535, 559 (1990) (citing Patricia Winters, Why the FDA
Made Sandoz Pull Drug Ad, ADVERTISING AGE, February 29, 1988, at 70).
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sacrifice compensation of an injured plaintiff to ideals of effi-
ciency These incidents show that there is a need for judicial
action to supplement FDA policing of its guidelines and regula-
tions.
A related argument is the problem of agency capture.
Capture is a phenomenon by which the industry, such as the
pharmaceutical industry, that an agency purports to regulate
actually exerts de facto control over the policy making of the
agency. Once an agency is captured by the industry it regu-
lates, agency policy makers and adjudicators have incentives to
defer to the interests of the industry rather than protecting the
interests of consumers. While this article does not charge the
FDA with capture by the pharmaceutical industry, judicial
review of companies' actions independent of and supplemental
to agency action guards against capture by lessening the unilat-
eral power of the agency, making capture less attractive to the
industry.
2. "Judicial Incompetence"
A common refrain in modern critiques of the tort system is
judicial incompetence in dealing with complex scientific iss-
ues.73 Proponents of judicial incompetence argue that judges
and juries, being mere lawyers and laymen, cannot reliably and
efficiently dispense justice when doing so requires mastery of
complex facts. Since the FDA is staffed with experts in pharma-
cology, courts should defer to the regulations and decisions of
72 If Congress desired to expressly preempt state tort law, equity, and at
least one commentator, would insist that tort liability be supplanted by an
alternate compensation scheme. See Gregory C. Jackson, Comment, Pharma-
ceutical Product Liability May Be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-Fault
Alternative to Concurrent Regulation, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 199 (1992) (proposing
a model, to be funded by the industry (read, funded by consumers) based on
the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 (1988), and
the Swedish Pharmaceutical Insurance program). Note, however, that the tort
system shares this program's normative goal of cost-spreading. See infra part
V.C.2.
73 Cf. PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S REvENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COuRT-
ROOM (1991) (arguing that while judges are perfectly capable of addressing
scientific issues, expert witnesses are instead paraded through the courtroom,
serving only to convolute the issues and confuse the jury); Question of Compe-
tence, supra note 68 (arguing that while the judiciary should defer to the
FDA's institutional superiority, the judiciary must ensure that the FDA has
sufficient information on which to base its decision).
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the FDA in matters relating to the manufacture and sale of
drugs.
This argument does not adequately describe failure to warn
litigation as a means for judicial review of direct-to-consumer
advertising. In failure to warn litigation, unlike other strict
liability litigation, the role of the jury as nonscientific arbiters
of community standards is pronounced because a fundamental
negligence inquiry exists at the heart of failure to warn litiga-
tion.74 Juries in failure to warn litigation are not asked to
evaluate the scientific merits of competing alternative designs
as in design defect litigation, nor are they faced with the com-
plex statistics and probability often found in manufacturing
defect litigation. Instead, the central inquiry in failure to warn
litigation is the reasonableness of the warning actually given,
and its effects on the hypothetical "reasonable person." For this
task, the jury is better suited than the expert agency. Jury
members do not bring the a priori knowledge of the expert to
their evaluation, but instead import true community standards
of the meaning and reasonableness of warnings.
The use of juries also rests on a solid theoretical foundation,
which relies on a republican theory of human nature and law
that competes with the liberal model implicit in judicial incom-
petence arguments.75 This theory holds that use of the jury
provides both the jurors and the participants in litigation with
a sense of being connected with the community in which the
litigation is taking place. This should ideally lead to a height-
ened sense of duty to the community and participation in the
polity, both of which are valid normative goals. In contrast, the
judicial system envisioned by critics of the tort system seems
singularly focused on the "efficiency" of the system and on the
result as between the two litigants as atomized individuals with
no sense of the effects of the judgment on the social fabric
surrounding the decision. A communitarian or republican
would charge that this system is based on an inferior conception
of human nature and society and should not be encouraged.
Tort law provides a sense of justice between the parties and
between the community of consumers and the manufacturer
that is not available in a sterile, efficient, "scientific" agency
proceeding.
See infra note 27.
75 See, e.g., Question of Competence, supra note 68.
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3. Tort as Cure for Market Failure
A fundamental justification for the tort system is its redis-
tributive and allocative justice effect. The tort system operates
to cure market failure by ensuring that products are marketed
at a price that truly reflects their societal cost. If a drug causes
injury to a significant portion of its target market, leaving those
injured users as an externality whom the manufacturer has no
incentive or duty to make whole, this creates an injustice and
artificially lowers the price for the remaining customers. Drugs
may have life-saving properties and thus represent a social good
in and of themselves. If there is a social good to be obtained,
equity demands that society as a whole bear the cost, not the
subset of society representing the unfortunate injured.
Some drugs, while possessing therapeutic merit, perhaps
cannot be profitably sold on the market without incurring
liability because of injuries to some users. This is the paradigm
cited by "reformers" of the tort system."6 The appropriate
mechanism for making these drugs available is government
action, either in the form of limited profit margins, limited
punitive damages or direct subsidy to the drug companies.
Whatever the mechanism, it must not hide the true costs of the
product behind the uncompensated injury of innocent
consumers.
The tort system, while spreading the costs of injuries caused
by a drug among the total pool of users of that drug, also serves
a limiting function. The costs of litigation, apart from recovery
paid to plaintiffs, are a transaction cost of the policing mecha-
nism of tort liability. While a perfectly "frictionless" system,
free of all transaction costs, is the ideal, it rarely exists outside
the writings of Richard Posner or Richard Epstein.
At least one commentator proposes limiting judicial involve-
ment in drug litigation to superficial review of FDA actions
governed by principles of administrative law." This system
would also carry its own costs. The common law rule that FDA
regulations provide only a floor, not a ceiling, for required
warning minimizes litigation over the mechanisms of the FDA
decision-making process. If tort recovery is limited or fore-
closed, every injured plaintiff will simply remake her claim into
a claim against the FDA for improper administrative procedure.
76 See 103 HARV. L. REV. 773, supra note 68, at 774-45.
77 See generally 103 HARV. L. REV. 773, supra note 68.
BYPASSING THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY
This will increase the FDA's cost of doing business, as well as
increase the costs of drug review to all manufacturers, not only
those who use unreasonable advertising. If the costs do not
devolve to manufacturers, they will be charged to taxpayers,
and so become yet another externality or subsidy driving down
the price of the product at no cost to the manufacturer. This
spreads the cost of doing business over a larger pool, but is
difficult to justify unless one posits that all manufacturers will
eventually have to face litigation, and so a common pool of
contributions to litigation costs is beneficial.
CONCLUSION
This article has presented regulatory law, case law and
normative policies favoring imposition of tort liability on manu-
facturers who advertise directly to consumers without carefully
considering the capacity of their audience to make a rational,
considered decision to accept the risks of using an advertised
drug. It should sound a cautionary note to manufacturers flush
with the success of recent advertising campaigns to carefully
calculate the benefits of the additional audience against the
potential tort liability exposure. Compliance with current FDA
regulations is insufficient, since those regulations do not explic-
itly consider the special problems facing direct-to-consumer
advertising, particularly the problem of adequately conveying
warning information without compromising the purpose of the
advertisement.
Careful screening of direct-to-consumer advertising
preserves the virtue of increased information to consumers
while also safeguarding the role of the physician in the decision
making process and, hopefully, lessening the inherent bias in
favor of glowing portrayals of drugs and encouraging balanced
depictions of the costs and benefits of the products.
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